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JUDGES AS TORT LAW UN-MAKERS: RECENT
CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE WITH "NEW" TORTS
Stephen D. Sugarman*
A straightforward reading of the title captures my central point: in
the past dozen years the California Supreme Court has repealed many
provisions of tort law that had been adopted by the court in earlier
years. The fundamental reason for this turnabout is a change in court
personnel with liberal Democrats, led by Chief Justice Rose Bird, gen-
erally replaced with moderate or conservative Republicans. I do not
dwell on this readily understandable political explanation for the
change in the law.
My goals are first, simply to document the extent of the retreat from
the court's previously pro-plaintiff inclination. Those who have not
been following the court may no longer recognize the California
Supreme Court they thought they once knew.1 Second, in the process
of describing this u-turn, I emphasize the extent to which the new
court has rejected some basic outlooks held by the old court on what
tort law of the late twentieth-century was supposed to be about.2
Finally, I demonstrate an ironic sense in which the new court is cre-
ating some "new" torts.3 The old court tended to eliminate law, in the
* Agnes Roddy Robb Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). I
thank Gary Schwartz and Bob Rabin who provided helpful comments, and Rebecca Krause who
provided helpful research assistance.
1. For a somewhat different appraisal of the work of the new court in the post-Bird era, see
Ellis Horvitz, An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Developments in Torts and Insurance Law:
The Common-Law Tradition, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rv. 1145, 1153-62 (1993).
2. I do not mean to suggest that the California Supreme Court is alone in its shift to a more
pro-defendant tort law. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990) (arguing that the current trend in
judicial decisions favors defendants); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of
the Rise of American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992) (arguing that the movement to ex-
pand tort liability has ended). California is perhaps an especially important case, however, be-
cause its supreme court was clearly one of the nation's most pro-plaintiff as of the end of 1986.
Tinothy D. Howell, So Long "Sweetheart": State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy Swings the
Pendulum Further to the Right as the Latest in a Line of Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 47, 93 (1997).
3. For other writings about "new" torts, see, for example, Anita Bernstein, How to Make a
New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539 (1997) (examining "new tort" causes of action
and cases); Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts": A Critical History, Taxonomy, and Appraisal, 95
DICK. L. REv. 23 (1990) (explaining the creation and use of the "new tort" concept).
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sense of overturning defense-oriented "rules" and separate legal "doc-
trines." The new court, at least in several areas, is doing the opposite
by embracing "new" (or older) rules. Hence, in some important re-
spects, it is re-establishing a tort "law" that removes power from juries
and returns it to judges (and also tilts in favor of defendants). In light
of this shift, one may read my title quite differently: it was the old
court that un-made law and the new one that is making it.
For this study, I examined the California Supreme Court's personal
injury law decisions for the past fifteen years (1984-1998), and uncov-
ered approximately fifty cases of at least moderate importance-an av-
erage of about three per year. I excluded from the study cases
involving only property damage, economic loss, defamation and pri-
vacy, insurance policy interpretation, as well as others not squarely
concerned with physical injuries. No doubt other scholars would add
or exclude some cases from my category (or wish I had bounded the
category differently), but I am confident that most torts professors
would basically agree that I have captured the court's important per-
sonal injury law decisions of the past fifteen years. To make one thing
clear at the outset, I do not mean generally to endorse or oppose the
stance of either the old or the new court.
I. 1984-1986 - THE END OF THE BIRD ERA
At the start of my study period, the court's membership included
five appointees of Democratic Governor Jerry Brown and one ap-
pointee of his father, Democratic Governor Pat Brown.4 Soon the
seventh position was filled by the new Republican Governor George
Deukmejian.5 Only these justices (apart from an occasional tempo-
rarily appointed justice) heard and decided the cases handed down in
the first three years of my study period. I think it fair to characterize a
majority of the justices during this initial period as broadly pro-plain-
tiff in their approach to tort law; this is especially true of then Chief
Justice Bird.
Nine of the approximately fifty cases in my study come from the last
three years of the Bird era-1984-1986. Taken as a whole, these deci-
sions reveal a court very willing to expand tort liability for modern
policy reasons-primarily that defendants are well-positioned both to
protect the public from harm and, when harm does occur, to bear the
4. Governor Jerry Brown's appointees were Rose E. Bird, Otto M. Kaus, Allen E. Broussard,
Cruz Reynoso and Joseph R. Grodin. Stanley Mosk was appointed by Governor Pat Brown.
5. The seventh position was filled by Malcolm M. Lucas in 1984.
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burden of compensation by spreading losses through liability insur-
ance and/or via the prices they charge for what they sell.
A. Background
This pro-plaintiff outlook was not new to the court in 1984. It is
more accurate to say that, by 1984, it was well entrenched. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's embrace of modern policy reasons in support
of defendant tort liability is perhaps best traced to two famous opin-
ions from prior eras. The first is Justice Traynor's 1944 concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,6 in which the
former Berkeley law professor argued that a manufacturer should in-
cur "an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to human beings."'7 Traynor openly
rested his call for what we have come to term "strict product liability"
on a variety of policy considerations, including safety promotion and
loss spreading.8 Traynor was still on the court nearly twenty years
later when his views about the proper legal treatment of defective
products were unanimously embraced in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.9
The second famous opinion I have in mind is that of Justice Peters
on behalf of the court in 1968 in Rowland v. Christian.10 There, the
California Supreme Court overthrew the ancient common law regime
that based liability for injuries incurred by those on one's property
upon the status of the victim-trespasser, licensee, or invitee." Not
only did the court usher in a new era in which these cases would be
decided under basic negligence principles, but also it based the change
in the law upon its balancing of a series of considerations (which I call
here the "Rowland factors") that plainly included modern policy
reasons:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
6. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 440.
8. See id. at 441.
9. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
10. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
11. See id. at 568.
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resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and preva-
lence of insurance for the risk involved.12
As a doctrinal matter, the Rowland decision still grounds occupier lia-
bility in the fault system and not strict liability; yet, the final three
considerations on its list of factors to be addressed clearly reflected
the thinking of those scholars in the era who were arguing for what
has generally been termed "enterprise liability."
Perhaps the most important contribution to that scholarly literature
is Guido Calabresi's now famous 1970 book called The Costs of Acci-
dents.13 In this and other writings, Calabresi argued against conven-
tional tort law-which he identified with the practice of making a
careful inquiry in every case as to whether this particular defendant
could reasonably have prevented this particular victim's injury-what
one might call "retail" decisionmaking. 14 Calabresi favored, instead,
what I call "wholesale" decisionmaking. One should rather ask
whether, in general, for the type of injury involved, defendants or
plaintiffs are more likely to be best positioned to know about the risks
and to take precautions designed to avoid the accident-a search for
what Calabresi called the "cheapest cost avoider."' 5 Although the
costs of some accidents might fall on victims under this approach, it
was clear that commercial and governmental actors (i.e., defendants)
would far more often be deemed cheaper cost avoiders than individ-
ual victims would be.16 Moreover, in deciding on whom to place the
costs of accidents, Calabresi further argued that one should consider
whether defendants or plaintiffs were more likely to be best able to
spread the loss, and in particular, to spread the loss in a way that con-
nected the cost to the type of accident involved.' 7 This latter inquiry
almost always would point towards injurer liability.
In the thirty years since Calabresi presented his ideas, no state
supreme court has fully and openly embraced them, even though
some courts occasionally use the phrase "cheapest cost avoider.' 18
Nonetheless, I believe that the safety promotion and loss spreading
considerations he so well articulated, factors that would lead to "en-
12. Id. at 564.
13. GuIno CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
14. See id. at 251.
15. See id. at 136.
16. See id. at 262.
17. See id. at 284-85.
18. See, e.g., Rankin v. City of Witchita Falls, 762 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1985); Union Oil Co. v.
Open, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561
(Wyo. 1992).
[Vol. 49:455
JUDGES AS TORT LAW UN-MAKERS
terprise liability" in most circumstances, substantially influenced the
California Supreme Court throughout the 1970s and for so much of
the 1980s as Justice Bird sat on the court.
This influence is well reflected, I believe, in the nine cases I ex-
amined from the last three years of the Bird era. Seven of those nine
decisions were won by plaintiffs in decisions that expanded tort law in
the plaintiffs' direction. Plaintiffs lost two cases and in both of them
Chief Justice Bird objected to the majority's opinion on the ground
that the court failed to broaden the application of the principle of
strict products liability to cover the facts at issue. The seven plaintiff
victories all involved efforts to hold defendants responsible for inju-
ries suffered either on the defendants' properties or from use of the
defendants' properties. And the reasoning throughout has a decid-
edly Calabresian bent.
In the next sections, I will briefly describe these three years of deci-
sions, both to provide some doctrinal details and to give the gist of the
court's thinking. I have grouped the cases under three headings.
B. Responsibility for the Wrongdoing of Others
Five of the cases, taken together, may be seen to have consolidated
California law around what some might call a "new" tort: you must
take reasonable precautions with respect to your property to protect
victims from foreseeable wrongdoing by third parties. One way to un-
derstand this group of cases is that the court concluded that it would
lend its hand to the crime-fighting effort of the day by enlisting prop-
erty owners in the battle through the threat of tort liability.
The first case involved a "key in the ignition," a problem the court
first addressed in 1954 in Richards v. Stanley.19 Back then, the court
was unsympathetic to the victim's claim against the vehicle owner
when an unauthorized third party took the vehicle and injured the
plaintiff. In addition to the fact that the owner in Richards had not
left his vehicle in a particularly dangerous area, the court seemed to
focus on the victim's need to look to the driver, not the car's owner,
for recompense. 20
As a practical matter, however, owners, who usually carry vehicle
insurance, are much more likely to be able to provide victim compen-
sation than an unauthorized driver, who might well be a teenage joy-
rider. Moreover, through the simple precaution of taking the keys
away, the driver/owner might easily forestall the injury in the first
19. 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954).
20. See id. at 29.
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place. Ten years later, the court began carving out exceptions to Rich-
ards, starting with Hergenrether v. East.2 1 There, the court allowed the
jury to impose liability where the "special circumstances" of the case
made the defendant's conduct foreseeably quite dangerous. 22
The court returned to the "key in the ignition" problem in 1984 in
Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.23 The plaintiff claimed that the
owner left a commercial truck overnight in a high crime industrial
area, unlocked, with the key in the ignition, and that the truck was
then stolen and carelessly driven by a third party who ran over the
plaintiff. The court pointed to several specific allegations, including
the type of people who frequented the area where the truck had been
left and the difficulty of safely operating the vehicle, in finding that
the defendant should not have been granted a summary judgment and
that the plaintiff had a right to have the case heard by the jury.2 4
Although the court did not overrule Richards outright and continued
to talk in terms of the "special circumstances" noted in Hergenrether,
the opinion makes clear that, as a practical matter, legal analysis of
this type of accident was to be brought inside the core of basic negli-
gence law. As the court put it, the factual issue for the jury was simply
"whether the circumstance in which [the defendant's] truck was left
created a foreseeable risk of harm that was unreasonable and thus
imposed on [the defendant] a duty of care to prevent harm to third
persons by refraining from creating that risk."'25
This application of general negligence principles to cases where a
third party uses the defendant's vehicle to harm the victim was made
even more explicit in a second "key in the ignition" case decided at
nearly the end of the Bird era. In Ballard v. Uribe2 6 the plaintiff of-
fered proof that the defendant knew that his vehicle, an aerial lift, was
in need of repair and quite dangerous to use in its existing condition.
Yet, according to the victim's witnesses, the defendant left his lift with
the keys in the ignition in a place where others could readily gain ac-
cess to it. Sure enough, the lift was operated by an unknowing co-
worker of the plaintiff, and when the basket flipped backwards be-
cause of the broken condition of the lift, the plaintiff, who had been in
the basket, was thrown out and hurt.2 7 The court held that the de-
fendant had a duty to protect others from the operation of its vehicle
21. 393 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1964).
22. See id. at 167.
23. 681 P.2d 893 (Cal. 1984).
24. See id. at 902.
25. Id. at 901.
26. 715 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1986).
27. See id. at 626.
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by third parties.28 It argued that, given the dangers involved, holding
an owner liable for negligently failing to control the unauthorized use
of his vehicle benefitted public safety without imposing an undue bur-
den on the owner. 29
In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Bird called for the outright
overruling of Richards.30 Although the court concluded that this was
not the "occasion to consider the continued vitality of Richards,' '31 I
believe that, by the time the court is through with Ballard, owners
have a general duty, because the vehicles belong to them, to exercise
due care to protect victims from injury caused by unauthorized third
party use of those vehicles. The jury is to bring to bear, in the specific
case, considerations of the size of the risk and the burden of precau-
tions.32 The court also made clear that in its deliberations a jury can
readily find that, since the burden is so small, an owner may be held
liable for leaving his or her keys in the ignition-provided that the cir-
cumstances in which the vehicle was left portend significant danger.33
Turning now to three other cases involving injuries caused by third
party wrongdoers (this time on the defendant's property), we again
see the Bird Court brushing aside specific legal requirements of ear-
lier case law. Instead, as with the "key in the ignition" cases, the court
embraces the general idea that with the ownership of property comes
the duty to protect persons on the property, even from the danger of
third party criminals. A breach of that duty depends, in turn, on an
individualized determination by the jury in each case of whether a
reasonable owner would have taken the specific precaution that the
victim identifies as lacking.
First came Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District,34
which involved an attempted daytime rape in the parking lot area of
the defendant's campus. The student plaintiff alleged that there had
been similar attacks in that region of campus that the defendant
should have warned her about and that the defendant should have
trimmed foliage growing near the stairway where the attack occurred.
The court overturned the trial court and held these allegations suffi-
cient to support a claim for "maintaining a dangerous condition of
28. See id. at 629.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 640 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
31. Id. at 628 n.5.
32. See Ballard, 715 P.2d at 629.
33. See id.
34. 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984).
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public property" under section 835 of the California Tort Claims
Act. 35
In Peterson, the court put aside earlier cases like Hayes v. State of
California36 which generally held that third party conduct does not
constitute a "dangerous condition" for which a public entity may be
held liable. 37 In Hayes, where two young men were attacked on a
university beach at night, the court applied modern policy analysis in
reaching its pro-defendant result. It worried that imposing tort liabil-
ity could lead to the closure of public facilities, and it belittled the
benefits of warnings about crime when the public was already well
aware of the risk of violent crime "particularly in unlit and little used
places" 38
But in Peterson, the court openly applied the earlier-quoted Row-
land factors in the other direction, now finding it wholly appropriate
for the defendant to have a duty to protect its students from the crimi-
nal wrongdoing of third parties.39 Emphasizing that the plaintiff had
been attacked in a much-used place in broad daylight, the court now
argued that warnings would be very beneficial. Adopting what I
would call Calabresian analysis, the court said that, "as a community
college district responsible for overseeing the campus, the defendant
and its agents are in a superior position to know about the incidences
of crime and to protect against any recurrences. '40
Next in this line came Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital,41 in
which a doctor sustained injuries when shot by an unknown assailant
in the defendant hospital's parking lot. The case focused on the plain-
tiff's claim that the defendant hospital should have provided increased
security measures in that parking lot. Precisely at issue was whether,
in deciding the question of the defendant's duty of care, the court
should apply the "prior similar incidents" test that had been required
by several previous lower court decisions.42
Once again the court applied the Rowland factors and concluded
that the jury should decide whether or not to impose liability based
upon the "totality of the circumstances. ' 43 As the court put it, limit-
ing liability to instances of "prior similar incidents" on the defendant's
35. Id. at 1203.
36. 521 P.2d 855 (Cal. 1974).
37. Id. at 858.
38. Id.
39. See 685 P.2d at 1200-01.
40. Id. at 1202.
41. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
42. See id. at 657.
43. Id. at 661.
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property violated public policy by discouraging landowners from tak-
ing precautions and denying recovery to the first victim. 44 By con-
trast, because the danger in this case was clearly foreseeable (the
hospital was in a high crime area and thefts and threatened assaults
had occurred nearby) and the burden on the hospital of providing ad-
equate security was comparatively low (two lights in the lot where the
assault occurred were not working and a security guard and TV cam-
era were used to monitor another of the hospital's lots), the court con-
cluded that the "value to the community of imposing such a duty is
manifest. 45
Finally, in Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit District,46 the
court held that, under California Civil Code Section 2100, a publicly-
owned, common carrier could be liable for injuries sustained when a
fight broke out on one of its buses.47 Based on the accepted general
duty of common carriers to their passengers, the court determined
that the carrier could meet its duty with respect to wrongdoing by
others by, for example, stopping the bus, requesting the disruptive
passengers to desist or leave, or alerting police.48 Such precautions
would provide considerable public safety while imposing a minimal
burden on the carrier. Again, using what I would call Calabresian
analysis, the court emphasized the crowded and confining nature of
buses and that "passengers have no control over who is admitted on
the bus and, if trouble arises, are wholly dependent upon the bus
driver to summon help or provide a means of escape. ' 49 The court
went on to say that "[t]hese characteristics of buses are, at the very
least, conducive to outbreaks of violence between passengers and at
the same time significantly limit the means by which passengers can
protect themselves from assaults by fellow passengers." 50
To be sure, the California Supreme Court had earlier broken new
ground in holding defendants responsible for the wrongdoing of third
parties because of their relationship to either the victim or the third
party. For example, that is the general principle underlying cases like
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,51 holding therapists
potentially responsible for harms caused by their patients, and John-
44. See id. at 655.
45. Id. at 662.
46. 710 P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985).
47. See id. at 914.
48. See id. at 911.
49. Id. at 912.
50. Id.
51. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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son v. State of California,52 holding state officials potentially liable for
harms caused by foster children to their foster parents. The five
newer cases I have described from 1984-1986 may be seen to have
extended the prior doctrine by seeing the legal duty as arising from
the defendant's relationship, not to a person, but to his property.
Another way to see these newer cases is as an extension of Rowland
itself. The five cases from 1984-1986 expanded the Rowland rule so
that it applies, not only to dangers emanating from the property itself,
but also to dangers connected to the property that are created by third
parties.
One may argue the results in these cases from 1984-1986 were read-
ily predictable from yet two other earlier California Supreme Court
cases-Coulter v. Superior Court53 and Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.5
4
Coulter imposed tort duties on social hosts who serve alcoholic bever-
ages to guests who then become drunk and carelessly injure others.
Hence, the court there arguably based one's legal responsibility on the
connection between your property (your booze) and the wrongdoing
of third parties.5 5 Coulter was subsequently overturned by legisla-
tion.56 Weirum, following Rowland, suggested that an individualized
jury determination about risk-taking and prevention might apply to all
tort cases cast in negligence, with specific legal rules largely dropping
out of the picture. There, the court said that the defendant radio sta-
tion could be held liable for the misconduct of others who were en-
ticed into their misconduct by the unreasonably dangerous advertising
the station ran (awarding prizes to those who were first to physically
find an on-the-move disc jockey).57
Given these various earlier decisions, I do not want to make too
much of the idea that the five cases I have just discussed from 1984-
1986 really do establish a "new" tort. I am confident, however, that
they show the court at work as "lawmaker"-candidly examining and
relying upon policy reasons for expanding the reach of tort doctrine in
various circumstances.
C. Strict Liability for Product Injuries
As I mentioned at the start, the California Supreme Court in Green-
man had already imposed strict liability on their manufactuers for de-
52. 447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968).
53. 577 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1978).
54. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
55. Coulter, 577 P.2d at 675.
56. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c) (West 1977).
57. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 41.
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fective products. Indeed, it had subsequently extended the principle
to cover others involved in the marketing chain, such as retailers5 8 and
lessors.59 One case from the 1984-1986 period took a giant step in
further expanding strict product liability by applying it to landlords.
In two other cases, both involving pharmaceutical drugs, the court de-
clined to further expand products liability. Chief Justice Bird dis-
sented in both cases, emphasizing the same policy reasons that drove
the court's other decisions from this era.
By imposing strict liability for defects in the condition of rental
units, Becker v. IRM Corp.60 was perhaps the most venturesome of
any of the court's decisions during the 1984-1986 period. The case
involved a tenant falling against a glass shower door which shattered,
severely lacerating his arm.61 The court held the landlord strictly lia-
ble for the injury-treating the door, in effect, as a defective product
because it was made of a type of glass prone to shattering.62 The court
characterized this as a sensible and reasonably logical extension of its
earlier applications of strict liability for products. Just as parties in-
volved in the distribution of products are in a better position than
consumers to prevent and carry the burden of harm, landlords were
seen to be in a better position than tenants to carry the burden of
inspection and the cost of injuries. In an openly Calabresian way, the
court opined "[t]he cost of protecting tenants is an appropriate cost of
the enterprise" and "the landlord ... may be able to adjust rents to
reflect such costs." 63
Two other cases from this era also concerned product liability, both
involving pharmaceutical drugs. In its earlier decisions, the California
Supreme Court seemed determined to expand the principle of strict
liability to cover more than manufacturing defects. Even for products
manufactured as intended, the court consistently emphasized that Cal-
ifornia had left negligence principles behind.64
Nonetheless, as scholars and other courts soon discovered, it was
not obvious what a design or warning defect could be if there were no
negligence with respect to the product's design or warning. Put differ-
ently, if a court truly rejected negligence in those settings, would it
require anything more than the fact that someone was injured? If not,
that would seem to equate "defect" with "cause."
58. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
59. See Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722 (Cal. 1970).
60. 698 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1985).
61. See id. at 117.
62. See id. at 122.
63. Id. at 124.
64. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
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One set of cases concerns dangers that are revealed only after the
time of manufacture. Imposing strict liability would mean judging
knowledge about the danger at the time of trial rather than at the time
of manufacture. This same approach could be applied to newly dis-
covered technological developments, which, if judged as of the time of
trial instead of the time of manufacture, would also impose strict lia-
bility. Earlier, the California Supreme Court seemed to head down
this "hindsight" route in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.65
It was not clear, however, just why liability should fall on these
manufacturers and not on others whose products caused harm but did
not experience technological advancements or newly revealed knowl-
edge between the time of manufacture and the time of trial. More-
over, some commentators began to express concern that this hindsight
approach would impose inappropriate, uncertain, and potentially crip-
pling liability on manufacturers of products of great social value, such
as pharmaceutical drugs.66 They pointed out that Dean Prosser him-
self had sought, in comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, to preclude liability for socially valuable, but un-
avoidably unsafe, products like prescription drugs.67
In Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co.,68 the first of two prescription drug
cases from the end of the Bird era, the victim suffered visual damage
from a drug which was later determined to be harmful. Following a
jury verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed. 69 The court,
however, was able to duck the question of whether to apply hindsight-
based strict liability to the case because it was clear to the majority
that the plaintiff's trial theory was based upon the claim that the de-
fendant knew, or should have known, of the drug's danger at the time
the plaintiff took it-a negligence-based notion. On that theory, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had a fair hearing by the jury.70
Chief Justice Bird disagreed with the court, arguing for the applica-
tion of strict liability. She emphasized that the policies underlying
strict liability in general-deterring poor manufacturing, design, test-
ing, and compensating victims by imposing the cost of injury on the
party best positioned to pay-apply equally well to prescription drugs
as to other products to which the court had extended strict liability.71
65. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
66. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CAL. L. REV. 919, 921 (1981).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
68. 677 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1984).
69. See id. at 1151.
70. See id. at 1154.
71. Id. at 1164.
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Bird cited the serious injuries caused by defective drugs, as well as the
large numbers of consumers who take them with minimal awareness
of possible risks, arguing that a drug manufacturer is in a better posi-
tion to absorb the costs of injury. According to Bird, a drug manufac-
turer should be strictly liable whenever a drug fails to meet ordinary
consumer safety expectations, or to provide a benefit that greatly out-
weighs its risk. 72 Explicitly embracing the hindsight test, Bird advo-
cated basing the manufacturer's knowledge on the information
available at the time of trial, not at the time of manufacture.73
The second pharmaceutical drug case, Murphy v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc.,74 went against a plaintiff (4-3) who sought to hold her phar-
macist strictly liable for providing her with a harmful drug. Although
some commentators had earlier proposed extending strict liability
from products to services, and although some courts had began cross-
ing the line into what appeared to be hybrid product-service cases, the
California Supreme Court, having just taken one large step in impos-
ing strict liability on landlords in Becker, refused to take the next giant
step in Murphy.75 Instead, the court analogized a pharmacist's role of
dispensing drugs to a service like manufacturing blood plasma which
was protected against strict liability by Section 1606 of the California
Health and Safety Code.76 The court also relied on policy grounds,
stating that "if pharmacies were held strictly liable for the drugs they
dispense, some of them, to avoid liability, might restrict availability by
refusing to dispense drugs which pose even a potentially remote risk
of harm, although such medications may be essential to the health or
even the survival of patients" or by selecting "the more expensive
product made by an established manufacturer when he has a choice of
several brands of the same drug. '77
Chief Justice Bird, joined by Justices Broussard and Kaus, dis-
sented, finding that the pharmacist's role as salesman predominates
his or her role as service provider. 78 Moreover, she argued, in
Calabresian style, that applying strict liability to pharmacists would
serve all the policies served by strict liability in general-by encourag-
ing the pharmacist to take precautions, as well as preventing the indi-
72. Id. at 1168.
73. Id.
74. 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 252.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 258 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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vidual unlucky patient from having to bear the financial burden of his
or her own injuries.79
Summing up these product liability decisions, many would say that
Becker established a "new" tort. In any event, what I see is a court
carefully considering new policy proposals put before it in the prod-
ucts liability area, and deciding, much like a legislature, whether it
would, on balance, be wise to sharply expand defendant responsibility.
One large step in that direction was taken and two other steps were
put off, at least for the time being.
D. Responsibility for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The remaining case from the end of the Bird era that I will discuss
involved the negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") upon
a family member based on harm occurring to a child. The California
Supreme Court broke ground on NIED claims nearly twenty years
earlier in Dillon v. Legg,80 which allowed recovery in certain circum-
stances by those who witness a close relative's harm. Ochoa v. Supe-
rior Court8' was one of several cases that had come before the
California courts since then, asking the court to determine the bound-
aries of an NIED cause of action. In Ochoa, the Bird Court liberal-
ized the boundary by allowing a mother to recover for the emotional
distress she suffered when watching her son deteriorate from the lack
of proper medical attention while he was held in a juvenile hall
infirmary.82
Before Ochoa, however, an NIED claim seemed to require a "sud-
den occurrence" of harm; the court now concluded that such a re-
quirement "arbitrarily limits liability when there is a high degree of
foreseeability of shock to the plaintiff and the shock flows from an
abnormal event, and, as such, unduly frustrates the goal of compensa-
tion-the very purpose which the cause of action was meant to fur-
ther."' 83 Hence, Ochoa portended the possibility that, A la Rowland,
juries might soon decide all NIED cases on a case-by-case basis in
terms of the foreseeability of harm under the specific circumstances.
E. Overall
As noted already, the seven plaintiff victories in the 1984-1996 pe-
riod generally reflect Calabresi's ideas. Becker, which extended strict
79. Id.
80. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
81. 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 7.
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liability to landlords for defective shower doors, surely does. Land-
lords, more than new tenants, are plainly better positioned to know
and do something about replacing dangerous shower doors and other
dangerous conditions in the apartment. In any event, through rent,
landlords can spread across all tenants the cost of inevitable accidents
from shower door injuries to unlucky victims.
Although couched in the language of negligence law, I think cases
like Lopez, Isaacs, and Peterson also reflect this Calabresian outlook.
These commercial or governmental property owners and operators
are much better positioned than individual victims to take precautions
to prevent injury by third-party wrongdoers. These property owners
can also spread the cost of accidents over the prices they charge for
their activities, whether it is for bus fares, parking lot fees, or college
tuition.
To be sure, victims in these sorts of cases were supposed to prove
that the proposed safety precautions were not only feasible, but would
really have made a difference-the sort of retail decisionmaking that
Calabresi opposed. This evaluation, of course, was to be made by ju-
rors-participants who, at the time, many observers suspected were all
too willing to impose costs on corporate and governmental defendants
without being too picky about the subtleties of tort law's fault
requirement.
This point leads me to another over-arching theme. Writing in the
early 1970s, Harry Kalven, in many respects an ideological opponent
to Calabresi, observed that tort law was becoming simplified and
stream-lined.84 Courts were tossing aside many of the old specific
"rules" of tort law. Rowland was perhaps the most prominent exam-
ple-scuttling complex rules about the law of occupier liability to invi-
tees, licensees, and trespassers.8 5 From all around the nation there
were many other cases in this same vein-especially those that cast
aside old "no duty" rules, including, for example, cases that eliminated
so-called spousal immunity,86 brushed aside automobile "guest stat-
utes,"87 and recognized rights of consortium in both spouses.88
Kalven seemed to applaud this development, although he noted it was
ironic that, just as minor irregularities and inconsistencies of tort law
84. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., Tort Watch, 34 ATLA L.J. 1 (1972) (commenting on the
growth of strict liability) [hereinafter Kalven, Tort Watch]; Harry Kalven, Jr., Negligence on the
Move, 33 ATLA L.J. 1 (1971) (commenting on the growth in the law within the negligence
principle).
85. Rowland v. Christian, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1968).
86. See Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
87. See Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (1973).
88. See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).
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were being eliminated, there was developing an enormous inconsis-
tency in tort law-with some domains governed by the fault principle
and others by the principle of strict liability.89
The practical result of the elimination of many of these old rules
(seen most clearly in the occupier liability area) was to transfer much
power from judges to juries. To be sure, judges, at least in theory,
could still grant summary judgments and directed verdicts in appropri-
ate individual cases. But these hurdles were usually easy to jump, per-
haps in part as a result of the increased sophistication of the plaintiff's
bar and the growing availability of expert witnesses who would say
just about anything. In short, the purification of the negligence re-
gime increasingly meant that the law was what an individual group of
jurors said it was. In its favor, this trend had, among other things, a
kind of egalitarian spirit to it that well fit the thinking of many 1960s
liberals.
Whether or not surreptitiously intended as a way of creating strict
liability, many of the Bird Court's decisions I have discussed pushed
California tort law in this "lawless" direction as well. This substitution
of jury decisionmaking for judge-applied legal rules is clearly seen in
cases like Ochoa,9° Isaacs,91 and the "key in the ignition cases."' 92
Again, each generally moved those sorts of cases out of the hands of
judges into the hands of juries.93
As an aside, there is one final case from this era that I cannot resist
mentioning, even though it is outside my category. Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil of California94 capped an impor-
tant series of earlier decisions by the California Supreme Court that
viewed defendants as having abused their positions under contract
law. These included employers who wrongfully discharged employ-
ees, insurers who wrongfully refused to pay valid claims, landlords
who wrongfully evicted tenants, and so on.95 Seaman's involved the
wrongful refusal to acknowledge the existence of a contract.96 Not
89. Kalven, Tort Watch, supra note 84, at 2.
90. As discussed in supra Section D. Ochoa rejected Dillon's rules for individualized inquiries
in NIED cases.
91. See supra Section B for Isaacs rejection of "prior similar incidents" for a "totality of the
circumstances" test.
92. Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1986); Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, 681 P.2d 893
(Cal. 1984).
93. I do not mean to argue that all of the Bird-era cases I reviewed are of this sort. Becker v.
IRM, for example, took the issue of individualized fault determination away from the jury by
imposing strict liability on the landlord. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 122 (Cal. 1985).
94. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984).
95. See id. at 1166.
96. See id.
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wanting to limit victims to their conventional contract rights, the court
adopted the "bad faith" concept that, when violated, constituted a
tort, thereby providing victims with access to both compensatory pain
and suffering damages and punitive damages. 97 Many would say this
"bad faith" area of the law amounts to a "new" tort.
In sum, though perhaps not amounting to gigantic expansions of
tort law, the California Supreme Court cases I have reviewed from the
1984-1986 period surely constitute definite extensions of the law.
Even if not "new" torts, the pro-plaintiff decisions certainly represent
the embracing of new legal duties, particularly for landlords, vehicle
owners, and other property owners.
II. THE PAST TWELVE YEARS - THE POST-BIRD ERA
A. The Voters Refuse to Retain
Under California Law, the governor appoints supreme court jus-
tices, but the voters must later approve them for new terms in periodic
"retention" elections. 98 Three pro-plaintiff judges, Chief Justice Bird
and Associate Justices Reynoso and Grodin, came up for retention
simultaneously in 1986. In a bitter election, fought in public primarily
over "death penalty" issues, the voters rejected these justices and
thereby removed them from the court. Other justices promptly re-
placed them, and with that came an abrupt change in the ideological
stance of the court as a whole.
By March of 1987 the only Democratic-appointed justices left on
the court were Justices Mosk and Broussard, and the latter retired in
1991. Today, Justice Mosk soldiers on, having now served for thirty-
five years since his appointment by Governor Pat Brown in 1964. By
now, all but two of Governor Deukmejian's eight appointees have
also left the bench, having been replaced by four appointees of Re-
publican Governor Pete Wilson.
B. Reversing Gears
I have identified about forty personal injury decisions of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court from the past twelve years that I consider to be
at least moderately important. Taken as a whole, they present a dra-
matically different picture from the one painted so far. Plaintiffs did
not lose every one of these cases, but they lost most of them. Some
decisions involved the court's refusal to expand tort law further.
97. See id. at 1167.
98. See CAL. CONST. art. 6(a), § 16 (1966).
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Many involved retrenchment from earlier positions. Several cases
openly overruled highly visible decisions of the Bird era.
Taken as a whole, the cases decided by the California Supreme
Court in the past twelve years, in my judgment, reflect a very different
outlook on tort law than we saw under Chief Justice Bird's leadership.
First, although the court still faithfully rehearses the Rowland factors,
it now frequently draws very different conclusions about the direction
they point. Simply put, the court now broadly opposes the imposition
of liability on a defendant on the grounds that he either is well posi-
tioned to spread the cost of the accident or, as a general matter, is
probably better positioned to avoid the accident. In short, Calabre-
sian "enterprise liability" thinking is out of favor with the court. Sec-
ond, the court is now strongly inclined to re-introduce more detailed
rules into tort law-to take power back for judges and away from juries
(and thereby to give defendants clearer ideas about just what their
precise legal obligations are).
In this latter respect, we are confronted with the nice linguistic
irony that I noted at the outset: as the court has been cutting back on
the reach of tort law, it has made much new law in the sense of substi-
tuting "rules" for "jury discretion." 99 These are the main themes I will
illustrate as I skate over approximately forty personal injury law deci-
sions of the California Supreme Court since 1986. As in Part I, my
analysis groups these more recent cases under several headings.
C. Taking Responsibility for the Mis-Conduct of Others
As before, I will start with the issue of taking responsibility for the
wrongdoing of third parties. Here, in two important decisions, the
California Supreme Court has sharply shifted gears by taking a strong
pro-defendant stance.
In Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center,1°° an employee in the
defendant's shopping center, who had been raped by a stranger,
charged that the defendant was negligent in not providing security
guards. As Justice Mosk emphasized in his dissent, the court essen-
tially scuttles the "totality of the circumstances" test of Isaacs and res-
urrects the "prior similar acts" test.' 0' The court stated that because
there were no prior similar incidents on the defendant's property, this
limited the foreseeability of the danger, and so the precaution re-
99. Again, I do not want to be understood as arguing that the court is doing this in every
case-as I will point out below.
100. 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
101. See id. at 216.
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quested by the victim was too burdensome. 10 2 While the court tries to
cast its evaluation as a matter of the defendant's legal "duty" (an issue
for judges), this, of course, is exactly the sort of determination that the
Bird Court sought to give to juries in Isaacs. Ann M. is additionally
notable for the court's open assertion that "random, violent crime is
endemic in today's society. It is difficult, if not impossible, to envision
any locale open to the public where the occurrence of violent crime
seems improbable."'01 3 This reflects a very different attitude than that
of the Bird Court about what is realistic to expect landowners to do to
prevent crime.
In Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court,10 4
the plaintiff alleged that she was a customer in the defendant's restau-
rant when an unidentified criminal seized her and held her at gun-
point, threatening to harm her if the employee at the cash register did
not give him money. When the employee failed promptly to comply,
the criminal threatened to shoot the plaintiff, who screamed out in
fear for her life. Only then did the clerk open the cash register
drawer, after which the criminal took the money and ran. Although
the plaintiff was not shot, she claimed serious injury. The court held
that the defendant had no legal duty to comply with the robber's un-
lawful demands, emphasizing the defendant's legal right to defend his
own property.10 5 Once more, the court takes for itself the question of
whether it should impose certain safety precautions (to protect cus-
tomers from crime) on corporate defendants, and once again con-
cludes it should not. 0 6 Again, this is quite inconsistent with the Bird
Court's approach in Isaacs and Peterson which turned these matters of
reasonably required safety measures over to the jury.
Not all of the court's post-Bird decisions involving responsibility for
the wrongdoing of third parties were decided for defendants, however.
A pair of decisions imposes a duty based upon "negligent
misrepresentation."
First came Garcia v. Superior Court,0 7 where a convicted murderer
on parole kidnaped and killed the plaintiffs' mother. They claimed
that the defendant parole officer knew that the murderer had
threatened to kill their mother but nevertheless told her that he would
"not come looking" for her.'08 The court concluded that an action
102. See id. at 215-16.
103. Id. at 215.
104. 927 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1997).
105. See id. at 1269.
106. See id. at 1262.
107. 789 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1990).
108. See id. at 962.
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would lie if the jury was convinced that the defendant had "negli-
gently misrepresented" the risk to the mother. 0 9 Next came Randi
W. v. Moroc Joint Unified School District,110 where the plaintiff, a stu-
dent, alleged that she was sexually assaulted by someone who had
been the subject of prior charges of sexual misconduct. According to
the plaintiff, her school district had hired her assailant because his
prior school districts employers gave him unqualified positive refer-
ences even though they knew about the sexual impropriety complaints
against him."' Consequently, she sued those former employers, and
the court held this stated a cause of action for negligent misrepresen-
tation, relying upon Garcia.112
Hence plaintiffs in both Garcia and Randi W. were permitted to
hold their defendants liable for the criminal wrongdoing of third par-
ties-provided, of course, that they could prove at trial the allegations
of their complaints. Two points are worth noting about the limited
nature of the duties imposed in these cases. First, if the defendant
parole officer and school districts had just kept quiet, there would ap-
parently have been no basis for imposing liability upon them for not
disclosing what they knew about the dangerousness of the third party
in question. It was their affirmative misrepresentation of the danger
that created potential liability. Second, plaintiffs in both cases were
also required to show that the misrepresentation was actually relied
upon-by the victim herself in Garcia and by the hiring school district
in Randi W. The more pro-plaintiff dissenters in both cases offered
analyses that would not have required that reliance.
Next, I want to turn to quite different tort law settings in which
doctrine can serve the purpose of making one party responsible for
the fault of another. For example, in Privette v. Superior Court,113 a
worker, who sustained injuries when instructed by an independent
contractor to carry hot tar up a ladder, sued the property owner. The
court stated that "under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires
an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently danger-
ous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor's negli-
gent performance of the work causes injuries to others." 1 4 In effect,
this doctrine treats the independent contractor as though he were an
employee by imposing vicarious liability on the defendant. Another
109. See id. at 965.
110. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
111. See id. at 584.
112. See id. at 587.
113. 854 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1993).
114. Id. at 723.
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way to put this rule is to call it a "non-delegable duty." Ever since
Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp.,115 California law had permitted em-
ployees of the independent contractor to invoke the "peculiar risk"
doctrine.
In Privette, however, the court overruled that longstanding prece-
dent, essentially on the grounds that the victim's access to workers
compensation benefits should be his exclusive remedy. 116 Put differ-
ently, it saw the old rule as providing access to a deep pocket, one that
the court concluded was not really necessary when workers compensa-
tion was already available. The court also thought it unfair that the
defendant who was not at fault would have greater responsibility to
the victim than the careless independent contractor, against whom no
tort claim by the victim, or claim for indemnity from the defendant,
would lie.117 Of course, a parallel situation sometimes applies in other
workplace settings in which the employer is at fault and the employee
sues a third party, such as a manufacturer who is held strictly liable for
a defective product.'1 8
Cutting off access to a second deep pocket through tort law when
workers compensation is available has been a recurring theme for the
new court. For example, in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dis-
trict,119 the court decided that when a worker suffers a physical injury,
workers compensation provides the exclusive remedy.' 20 Thus the
worker may not sue the employer in tort for emotional distress, even
if tort law would compensate damages when workers compensation
does not. 121
115. 369 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1962).
116. 854 P.2d at 731.
117. See id. at 728.
118. In Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, 955 P.2d 504 (Cal. 1998), the court reaffirmed and
slightly expanded the reach of Privette.
119. 729 P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987).
120. Id. at 744.
121. See also Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Cal. 1992). In Livitsanos, the
court expanded Cole to cover situations in which emotional distress damages were sought in tort
and no physical injury was alleged. Id. Still, workers compensation was to be the victim's only
remedy even if it provided no compensation. Later, the court eased up a bit on the "exclusive
remedy" rule both in Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc., 945 P.2d 781, 782 (Cal. 1997) (holding that
the exclusive remedy principle did not bar a claim by a child who was in utero when allegedly
injured from her mother breathing carbon monoxide while at work) and Fermino v. Fedco, Inc.,
872 P.2d 559, 560 (Cal. 1994) (concluding that a claim for false imprisonment was not barred by
workers' compensation law).
For another example of the new court restricting access to a deep pocket, see Evangelatos v.
Superior Court. 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988). There, in passing, the court (albeit in dicta) seems to
have abandoned the position taken earlier in American Motor Cycle v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d
899 (Cal. 1978), as to how the risk of insolvency is to be born in cases with multiple tortfeasors.
Evangelatos, supra at 590. In American Motor Cycle, the court seems to say that the California
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Conventional vicarious liability of employers for the torts of their
employees is, of course, another setting in which the doctrine of strict
liability applies and serves, among other things, to give the victim ac-
cess to a presumptively deeper pocket. It also arguably gives addi-
tional safety incentives to those who are "cheaper cost avoiders" than
the victims. The court in recent years has confronted several difficult
vicarious liability cases involving intentional sexual misconduct by
employees.
In John R. v. Oakland Unified School District,122 the court held vica-
rious liability was inapplicable when a junior high school pupil was
allegedly sexually molested by his math teacher, in the teacher's apart-
ment, while participating in an officially sanctioned extracurricular
program. The doctrinal issue in these sorts of cases has traditionally
been cast as whether the tort was committed "within the scope of em-
ployment. ' 123 At the time of John R. there was a division of opinion
as to how to treat sexual assaults by employees-both in courts around
the nation and in the lower California courts.
The new court decided in favor of the defendant in John R. after
exploring the policy goals underlying vicarious liability. A Calabre-
sian analysis would probably impose vicarious liability on both loss
spreading and safety promoting grounds. But the California Supreme
Court asserted that loss spreading was inappropriate here both be-
cause it would make insurance more difficult for already-strapped
school districts to obtain and because this injury was not fairly part of
the risk allocable to the district. 124 The court was equally skeptical
about the accident prevention rationale, claiming that "strict liability
in this context would be far too likely to deter districts from encourag-
ing, or even authorizing, extracurricular and/or one-on-one contacts
between teachers and students or to induce districts to impose such
rigorous controls on activities of this nature that the educational pro-
cess would be negatively affected."'1 25
In Farmers Insurance Group v. County of Santa Clara,126 the court
put forward essentially the same policy analysis, holding that the
rule was that the solvent defendants would be responsible for any share of the loss otherwise
assigned to an insolvent defendant-and that no part of the insolvency would be born by the
victim, even at-fault victims. But with no discussion, Evangelatos embraces the view (supported
by some subsequent lower California decisions) that the risk of insolvency would also be propor-
tionately shared by any plaintiff who was also at fault. Evangelatos, supra at 595.
122. 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989).
123. Id. at 953.
124. See id. at 956.
125. Id.
126. 906 P.2d 440 (Cal. 1995).
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county was not responsible for the acts of a deputy sheriff who lewdly
propositioned and offensively touched other deputy sheriffs. 127 Fi-
nally, in Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital128 the
court, focusing more this time on issues of basic fairness, held that a
hospital was not vicariously liable for the conduct of a hospital techni-
cian who sexually molested a patient under the pretense of conducting
an ultrasound examination. 29
Oddly enough, despite these three pro-defendant rulings, the court,
in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles130 (decided after John R. but before
Farmers and Lisa M.) concluded that a city could be held vicariously
liable for the conduct of its police officer who raped a woman he had
detained and taken to her home. 131 The court held that when a police
officer detains a person and then misuses his authority while she is in
his custody, it is the jury's decision to find whether he was acting
within the scope of his employment. 132 In contrast to John R., the
court in Mary M. rejected the claim that liability would generate a
perverse behavioral response by the defendant; to the contrary, it as-
serted that vicarious liability might actually lead to socially desirable
prevention measures by the police department. 33 I will not try to rec-
oncile these four vicarious liability decisions, which were all decided
by a divided court with a changing membership. Rather, I will simply
note that, if nothing else, the difficulties the court had with these cases
at least shows that sweeping "cheapest cost avoider" and "cheapest
loss spreader" considerations are clearly insufficient to create liability.
This trend appears in other cases as well, including two in which the
court refused to impose a duty on the defendant to take responsibility
for harms to victims that were more directly caused by a party other
than the defendant. In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Val-
ley, 34 the parents of a young suicide victim sued a large, wealthy
church when one of its clergymen failed to prevent the suicide through
religious counseling. The church could easily be viewed as the
"cheapest cost avoider" and surely the "cheapest loss spreader" in this
situation, and yet the court declined (for arguably very good reasons)
to impose liability on the basis of an alleged negligent performance of
127. See id. at 444.
128. 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995).
129. Id. at 359.
130. 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991).
131. See id. at 1342.
132. See id. at 1352.
133. See id. at 1348.
134. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
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spiritual counseling.135 In Artiglio v. Coming, Inc.,136 plaintiffs sought
to hold Dow Chemical liable for injuries alleged to have been caused
by silicone breast implants manufactured by its partially owned, and
now bankrupt, subsidiary Dow Corning. Their case was based upon
the theory that when Dow Chemical had "undertaken" certain re-
search and testing activities, this created an ongoing obligation for it
to take responsibility for the safety of the product in question.137 Dow
Chemical was certainly a "cheaper loss spreader" than the plaintiff
and because of its expertise in product testing, an apparently far supe-
rior source of accident prevention. Yet, the court showed no interest
whatsoever in deciding this case at the wholesale level, finding instead
that, as a matter of law, the risk of harm to these plaintiffs was unfore-
seeable when Dow Chemical had undertaken those specific instances
of silicone research and testing in the past, and hence the grant of
defendant's summary judgment motion was proper.
D. Strict Product Liability
I turn next to the core of products liability, where the retreat from
prior law is stark. Perhaps most strikingly, in Peterson v. Superior
Court,138 the new California Supreme Court simply overruled Becker.
There, a hotel guest was injured by slipping on the surface of an alleg-
edly defective bathtub. Portions of the opinion read very much like
the report of a legislative committee that has decided a previous law
has not worked out very well, or perhaps even more like the report of
a legislative committee whose minority has recently become its major-
ity. Noting that California had stood virtually alone in imposing strict
liability on landlords, the new court membership claimed that "only in
rare cases would the imposition of strict liability upon the landlord or
hotel owner create an impetus to manufacture safer products."'1 39 As
for the question of which party was more likely to discover the defect,
the court focused in on the issue at the retail level, asserting "a tenant
cannot reasonably expect that the landlord will have eliminated de-
fects in a rented dwelling of which the landlord was unaware and
which would not have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.' 40
Moreover, the new court sounded very wary of simply providing an-
other deep pocket (a good loss spreader) for the innocent victim of a
135. See id. at 952.
136. 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998).
137. See id. at 1318.
138. 899 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1995).
139. Id. at 915.
140. Id. at 918.
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product defect to sue-a theme we saw already in the third party
wrongdoer cases just discussed and will encounter again and again be-
low. In short, the victim was relegated back to negligence law so far
as the landlord is concerned-although the victim could still pursue the
bathtub maker in strict liability.
This Peterson decision is but one example of the court's retrench-
ment on products liability. In several other cases, with import both
large and small, the court (despite some rhetoric to the contrary) is
slowly, but steadily, pushing California products liability law away
from any remaining pretense of strict liability into a decidedly fault-
based framework (apart from routine manufacturing defect cases).
In Brown v. Superior Court,141 the court rejected the application of
its then basic products liability doctrine as articulated in Barker.
Brown was a DES case which clearly involved a product that surprised
the plaintiff by turning out to be dangerous. 142 The court first decided
that Barker's "consumer expectations" test was inapplicable because,
with pharmaceutical drugs, the consumer's expectations are based on
the doctor's warnings, not the drug itself, and a manufacturer should
not be liable for a doctor's failure to warn. 143 The court also cited
public policy reasons for not imposing strict liability on the manufac-
turer based on the "consumer expectations" test, asserting that, in the
case of drugs, it would result in marketing delays or reluctance on the
part of manufacturers to develop new drugs.144 Second, the court re-
jected the applicability of strict liability via the "hindsight" test to the
defective warning aspect of the case-saying that the defendant could
not be held liable for "risks inherent in a drug... it neither knew nor
could have known by the application of the scientific knowledge avail-
able at the time of distribution.' 45 In short, drug makers would be
held to something that sounds to me very much like the fault princi-
ple-thereby, laying aside the uncertainty that remained after Finn.
After Brown, the court decided Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiber-
glas Corp.,146 an asbestos case. I find this opinion something of an
indecipherable mish-mash. The court claims that it is continuing to
apply strict liability to non-drug warning cases because the defendant
is to be precluded from arguing that it was reasonable to fail to dis-
close dangers known to it at the time of manufacture. 147 Of course, it
141. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
142. See id. at 473.
143. See id. at 476-77.
144. See id. at 478.
145. Id. at 480.
146. 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
147. See id. at 559.
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would almost always be negligent to fail to disclose any substantial
known danger; the more important issue was what to do about un-
knowable dangers. As to that, the court clearly rejected the "cheapest
loss spreader" ideology that seemed to underlie decisions of the Bird
era.148 It admitted that although "an important goal of strict liability
is to spread the risks and costs of injury to those most able to bear
them ... it was never the intention of the drafters of the doctrine to
make the manufacturer or distributor the insurer of the safety of their
products.' 49 By emphasizing "How can one warn of something that
is unknowable?' 150 the court clearly rejects Calabresi's wholesale ap-
proach which would surely view chemical manufacturers as generally
far more likely than chemical users to find out in advance about the
dangers of their products and take actions to prevent injuries. As for
loss spreading, the court makes the point in Anderson that, when the
risk is unforeseeable, even large corporations might well be unable to
spread losses widely. 151 Moreover, although the court argues that its
embrace of fault-based responsibility for warning defects is to be dis-
tinguished from how California law treats design defects, as we will
see next, the court has now largely imposed a negligence-like ap-
proach there as well.
In Soule v. General Motors Corp.,152 the plaintiff's ankles were
badly injured when her car collided with another vehicle. She claimed
that her GM car was defective because its left front wheel broke free,
collapsed rearward, and smashed the floorboard into her feet. 53 The
plaintiff made two main legal claims-that her car had been improperly
welded (manufacturing defect) and that Ford had a better safety de-
sign that GM should have adopted (design defect). 154 GM disputed
both of these points. Over GM's opposition, the trial court charged
the jurors that they could find for the plaintiff on the "consumer ex-
148. The Bird era, led by Chief Justice Rose Bird, repealed many provisions of tort law previ-
ously adopted by the court.
149. Anderson, 810 P.2d at 559.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 559 n.14. I do not believe that my position as to the state of "warning" law in
California after Anderson is undermined by Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996),
a subsequent pharmaceutical drug case about warnings decided by a panel including three tem-
porarily-assigned lower court judges. Although Justice Mosk's opinion for the court again tried
to make a big deal of the difference between failure to warn in the strict liability context and the
negligence context, this still seems of little moment to me. Basically, the court concluded that a
drug maker could be liable for the "failure to warn about the known or reasonably scientifically
knowable dangerous propensities of its product." Id. at 1348. This is a restatement of the hold-
ing in Anderson, and still basically sounds like negligence to me.
152. 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994).
153. See id. at 301.
154. See id. at 302.
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pectations" test-a test that, if applied to GM in this setting, could
clearly be used to impose liability without fault on the carmaker. 155
Expanding the reach of Brown beyond pharmaceutical drugs, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decided that "the consumer expectations test is
reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's
users permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum
safety assumptions"156-a condition absent from this case. Instead, the
court said that these sorts of cases, where there realistically are no
consumer expectations about wheel collapses in crashes, must be eval-
uated under the risk/benefit test.' 57
To be sure, the court in Soule explicitly refused to overrule the con-
sumer expectations test for all cases, as GM had pressed and some
other states have done.' 58 Indeed, the court made clear that doing so
would mean, in effect, relegating all design defect cases to negligence
law-something it was unwilling to do, at least at the time. Further-
more, the court also rejected GM's effort to reverse California's law
that imposed the burden of proof with respect to design defects on the
defendant. 59 Nevertheless, it seems to me that for a great number of
complex products, Soule, as a practical matter, turns the trial of design
defect cases in California into proceedings virtually indistinguishable
from what they would be were the plaintiff required to prove design
negligence. 6°
The new dominance of a fault orientation in the product liability
arena may also be seen in Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court,'6' where
the court refused to follow the lead of more plaintiff-orientated juris-
dictions when dealing with "natural" substances found in restaurant
food. There, a patron claimed to suffer throat injuries when he swal-
lowed a one inch chicken bone that unexpectedly appeared in his
chicken enchilada. Application of strict liability via the consumer ex-
pectations test, so much touted in Barker, might well have been justi-
fied by the court on the grounds that, since the victim had no warning,
the defendant was best situated to avoid these sorts of injuries or
spread the risk when they inevitably occurred. However, the court
155. Id. at 303.
156. Id. at 308.
157. Id. at 309.
158. Soule, 882 P.2d at 310 and n.7.
159. An advantage, by the way, that I understand experienced plaintiffs' lawyers will never
rely upon unless they are completely unable to come forward in their part of the case with
alternative design proposals.
160. Note that the court in Soule ultimately decided that giving the consumer expectations
test instruction was harmless error since the plaintiff so clearly emphasized fault-based theo-
ries-bad welding and bad design-in the presentation of her case. 882 P.2d at 310-12.
161. 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992).
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concluded that when the substance is "natural" to the food, as a bone
is natural to chicken, the victim is not entitled to expect complete
safety and hence may only proceed against the defendant in
negligence. 162
One final fact-specific product injury case is also worth noting. In
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,163 the court decided that a children's aspirin
was not a defective product when the manufacturer provided the
warnings only in English even though it widely advertised and sold the
product in parts of the state where large numbers of monolingual
Spanish speakers lived. The court rejected the pro-plaintiff result of
an earlier New Jersey decision on similar facts and instead decided
that drug manufacturer compliance with federal and state warning re-
gimes should, as a matter of law, dictate that the product was not de-
fective. 164 This decision was not a matter of federal pre-emption, but
rather the court's own, very self-conscious, choice to opt for a clear
uniform rule, rather than allow the jury to decide the issue of ade-
quacy of the warning from the facts on a case-by-case basis.
Although the new court in Ramirez does in the products liability
area what I earlier emphasized it has been doing in negligence
cases-i.e., adopting rules of law that take cases from the jury-I should
acknowledge here that several of the other product liability cases I
have discussed go the other way. That is, in rejecting strict liability for
negligence, in for example, Mexicali Rose and Peterson (the hotel
bathtub case), as well as in the cases discussed above that reject the
"consumer expectations" test, the court, all the while making the law
more pro-defendant, nonetheless creates a role for the jury.
E. The Boundaries of NIED Claims
A sharp change of direction also marked the new court's treatment
of NIED cases. In Thing v. La Chusa,165 the court effectively over-
ruled the Ochoa approach established at the end of the Bird era. In
Thing, a mother heard about an accident involving her child and ar-
rived at the scene moments later to find her badly injured child lying
in the road. The mother sued the driver who ran over her child for
NIED, but the court rejected the claim.166 Rebuffing the way Ochoa
had treated the problem, the court resurrected the Dillon factors as
162. See id. at 1294.
163. 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993).
164. See id. at 178.
165. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
166. See id. at 829-30.
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absolute legal requirements in NIED cases.167 No longer were those
factors merely guidelines to indicate the sorts of factors that would
help assure the genuineness and seriousness of the plaintiff's emo-
tional distress. In this way, returning to one of my main themes here,
power was removed from the jury and given to the trial judge who is
enabled to rule for defendants in appropriate cases as a matter of law.
Even before Thing, the new court expressed its desire to restrict the
availability of NIED claims. In Elden v. Sheldon,168 the court rejected
a lawsuit by an unmarried heterosexual domestic partner who wit-
nessed the negligent killing of her cohabitant when in a car together.
Once more adopting a clear legal rule rather than allowing the jury to
make an individualized judgment about the closeness of the relation-
ship, the court announced that NIED suits were restricted to those
who are legally married to the direct victim of the defendant's fault.169
Later, in Christensen v. Superior Court,170 the new court adopted a
restricted rule to govern who might sue for emotional distress arising
from the negligent (or even intentional) mishandling of a decedent's
remains, thereby narrowing the class of valid claimants who had been
recognized by the court of appeals.
This is not to say that no plaintiffs won their NIED cases before the
new court. In Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic,
Inc.,171 the court concluded that a mother had a cause of action for
NIED against a therapist who was counseling both her and her sons
(after the therapist allegedly sexually molested the sons). It appears
that the mother's own professional relationship with the therapist
gave her the "direct victim" status required by prior case law. 172 Fur-
thermore, in Burgess v. Superior Court,173 the same approach allowed
a mother to state an NIED claim against a doctor who negligently
injured her child in the course of delivering the baby. Since the doctor
was hired by her, she was a "direct victim."'1 74
However, the court called a halt to this development in Huggins v.
Longs Drug Stores California, Inc.175 Parents in that case unwittingly
injured their son by giving him a prescription overdose because the
167. Id. at 820. See also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (allowing recovery in certain
circumstances by those who witness a close relative's harms).
168. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
169. See id. at 585-86.
170. 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
171. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
172. See id. at 281.
173. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
174. See id. at 1203.
175. 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).
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defendant pharmacy had misinstructed them as to the proper dosage.
They sued for NIED but the court refused to treat them as "direct
victims. '176 As the majority saw it, the parents were customers on
behalf of their child, but they were not patients of the pharmacy in the
conventional sense. 177
The court also denied NIED recovery in Potter v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co.,178 where a group of landowners brought suit against a tire
manufacturer for fear of acquiring cancer from the hazardous wastes
the manufacturer dumped in a nearby landfill. The court held that,
barring physical injury or illness, a plaintiff must prove a fear based on
reliable medical and scientific opinion that he or she is more likely
than not to develop cancer in the future due to exposure.179 My point
here is that we yet again see the court taking upon itself the decision
as to where to draw the boundary around NIED claims, in contrast to
the direction the Bird Court seemed to be moving in Ochoa.
F. Other Areas of Tort Law: Win Some, Lose Some
1. Assumption of Risk
In Knight v. Jewett, 80 the court recognized that some so-called "as-
sumption of risk" cases are really better understood as "comparative
fault" cases (in which the careless victim should receive a partial re-
covery from the also careless injurer), whereas other cases are better
understood as "no duty" cases (in which the victim should recover
nothing).' 81 It would have been better, in my view, had the court just
abolished the use of the "assumption of risk" label and allocated the
cases to the other appropriate doctrinal categories. 182 The court did
not do that. More importantly for my purposes here, it chose to at-
tach the "no duty/assumption of risk" label in a sweeping way to rec-
reational injury cases.183
In Knight, the plaintiff and defendant were playing a casual game of
"touch" football. According to the victim, she had already told the
defendant to stop playing so roughly and he promised to be more
176. See id. at 150.
177. See id. at 154.
178. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
179. See id. at 800.
180. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
181. Although the court did not acknowledge it, still other "assumption of risk" cases are
better understood as "no breach" cases and perhaps "no proximate cause" cases.
182. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833 (1997)
(discussing alternatives to the "assumption of risk" label such as informed consent, no duty rules,
and comparative negligence).
183. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708-09.
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careful when, on the next play, he knocked her down, stepped on her
hand, and injured her. In what I view as a dubious empirical judg-
ment, the court claimed "vigorous participation in such sporting
events likely would be chilled if legal liability were to be imposed on a
participant on the basis of his or her ordinary careless conduct....
[I]mposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter funda-
mentally the nature of the sport."'184 In short, no duty was to lie apart
from "conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
the ordinary activity involved in the sport."' 85 Once more, the court
here adopts a rule pursuant to which, as a matter of law, certain vic-
tims will not recover, thereby denying the plaintiff the opportunity to
convince a jury that, under all the circumstances, the defendant's con-
duct was socially unacceptable. I do not mean to suggest that this is
the wrong function for a "no duty" rule to serve, but rather to indicate
my disagreement with the policy judgment that recreational injuries
are an appropriate place for such a "no duty" rule.
Apparently, to make sure that the lower courts get the point, the
court revisited the same basic issue three more times to emphasize the
idea that in the typical recreational injury case, juries are not to decide
whether, in the specific setting, this defendant had actually been un-
reasonably careless. The first was Ford v. Gouin,8 6 the companion
case to Knight, which involved a water skier who was injured and sued
the driver of the boat that was pulling him-on the grounds the driver
carelessly drove too close to the riverbank.' 87 The second was Par-
sons v. Crown Disposal Co.,188 where the plaintiff was thrown from his
horse after loud noises from a nearby garbage truck frightened the
horse. 189 The third was Cheong v. Antablin,19 where friends skiing
together crashed into each other, injuring the plaintiff, who sued his
fellow skier claiming negligence on the part of the defendant.' 9'
2. Other
As indicated already, not all plaintiffs lost their cases before the
new court. For example, in Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. ,192
the court refused to apply the so-called "firefighter's rule" (which bars
184. See id. at 710.
185. Id. at 711.
186. 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992).
187. See id. at 726.
188. 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997).
189. See id. at 71.
190. 946 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1997).
191. See id. at 819.
192. 882 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1994).
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recovery as a matter of law) to private employees who were injured
while battling a negligently set fire (restricting the rule's reach to pub-
lic firefighters).' 93 In Alcaraz v. Vece, 194 the court ruled in favor of a
tenant plaintiff who sued his landlord after stepping into a water
meter box with a missing or broken cover. The box was located in the
front lawn of the property, but technically on the property owned by
the city, not the defendant. The court concluded (4-3) that if the de-
fendant exercised control over that adjacent property that was not no-
ticeably separate from his, he would have a duty to warn his tenants of
dangers on that property. 195 These decisions (and others already
noted above) make clear that the new court is not single-mindedly
pro-defendant; rather, these two cases at least show the judges at work
trying to work out in a sensible way the details of negligence law as it
applies to newly presented situations. 196
The potentially most pro-plaintiff decision from the past twelve
years, in my judgment, is Mitchell v. Gonzales,197 in which the court
decided that trial courts should no longer give the "but for" jury in-
struction on causation, but should instead give a "substantial factor"
instruction. 98 This particular case involved the drowning of one of
three young children who had been playing together on a paddle
board in water deeper than they were tall. It appears that there may
have been some misunderstanding by the jury about the idea that
more than one cause can be a proximate cause of an injury.199 But
this decision could be enormously beneficial to plaintiffs in other cases
(and highly disruptive of traditional tort doctrine) if the shift in jury
instructions here ordered also undermines (as it would appear to)
traditional notions about "cause in fact." The court, in passing, tries
to make light of this possibility, saying that "[l~f the conduct ... had
nothing at all to do with the injuries," it could not be a substantial
factor in causing them.200 Yet this misses some far more difficult
193. See id. at 355-56.
194. 929 P.2d 1239 (Cal. 1997).
195. See id. at 1253.
196. Two more exotic cases were faced by the new court. First, San Diego Gas and Electric v.
Superior Court, where plaintiffs sued a public utility alleging injuries from exposure to electro-
magnetic fields created by power lines adjoining their property. 920 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1996). The
court barred the action under Public Utility Code Section 1759 as an impermissible interference
with the Public Utility Commission's broad regulatory authority. Id. at 704-05. Second, Moore
v. Regents of the University of California, was a very special "informed consent" case in which
the plaintiff successfully claimed that the defendants improperly used his cells for potentially
lucrative medical research without obtaining his prior permission. 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).
197. 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
198. See id. at 877-82.
199. See id. at 875-76.
200. Id. at 878.
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problems than the court seems to acknowledge. However, this is not
the occasion to go into these matters.201
G. Bad Faith Retreat
Finally, again as an aside, let me simply note that the new court has
largely gutted the "bad faith" law that was so steadfastly erected dur-
ing the Bird era and earlier. In Freeman & Mills v. Belcher Oil,202 the
court overruled the Bird Court's 1984 decision in Seamans. In
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.,2 0 3 the court over-
ruled Royal Globe v. Superior Court,204 an earlier California Supreme
Court decision which had allowed tort victims to bring bad faith
claims against their defendant's insurers when the latter refused to
settle. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,20 5 the court sharply curtailed
the tort rights of employees claiming "wrongful discharge. '20 6 More-
over, on a related front, the court in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v.
Superior Courtz 7 rejected the claimant's plea to create a "new" tort
for the "spoilage of evidence" in the context of a plaintiff asserting the
defendant had destroyed records that were crucial to his case.208
III. CONCLUSION
I have not tried to count up the numbers in any precise way, but my
recitation should make clear that the rate of success by tort plaintiffs
in the California Supreme Court is dramatically different over the past
dozen years than it was at the end of the Bird era. Calabresian think-
ing about enterprise liability as a way of dealing with the cost of acci-
dents is currently dead in the Golden State. At the same time, we
have lots of new rules and judicial decisionmaking in cases that, in
prior years, would have gone to juries with vague instructions about
fault attached. And so, I hope I have shown that, in their very differ-
ent ways, both the old and new courts have made and un-made a new
law of torts.
201. For another more defense-oriented foray by the court into the world of "causation," see
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214-22 (1997).
202. 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
203. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988).
204. 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
205. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
206. Id. at 384-86.
207. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
208. Id. at 515-17.
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